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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal arises from a diversity action brought by 
Pennzoil Products Company ("Pennzoil") against, among 
others, Colelli & Associates, Inc. and Colelli Oil Well 
Services, Inc. (collectively "Colelli"). Colelli sold to crude oil 
producers in Ohio a solvent, which was designed to reduce 
the accumulation of wax in the shafts of oil wells. The oil 
producers sold the oil to refineries, one of which was 
Pennzoil's refinery in Pennsylvania. Pennzoil alleges that 
Colelli's solvent contained silicon and that the silicon- 
tainted oil caused damage to its refinery. The district court 
granted Colelli's motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction and certified its order for interlocutory appeal. 
Because we conclude that Pennsylvania's long-arm statute 
extends personal jurisdiction to Colelli and that the exercise 
of such jurisdiction complies with constitutional due 
process requirements, we will reverse and remand to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
I. 
 
Pennzoil is a Nevada corporation with its principal place 
of business in Texas. Pennzoil operates an oil refinery in 
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Rouseville, Pennsylvania, for which it purchases Penn grade 
and Corning grade crude oil from producers in Ohio. The 
two Colelli entities are Ohio corporations with principal 
places of business in Ohio. Colelli is in the oil well 
maintenance business. It sells chemicals to oil producers to 
clean residue from their wells. Unlike most of the crude oil 
produced in the United States, Penn grade and Corning 
grade crude oil from the Ohio oil fields contain high levels 
of paraffin (i.e., wax). The high wax content results in the 
gradual accumulation of wax in the shafts of oil wells. Wax 
build-up impedes oil flow and production. Colelli sold a 
paraffin solvent to Ohio oil producers which they injected 
into the oil wells to reduce the accumulation of wax. As a 
result, however, the solvent also mixed with the oil 
produced from those wells. 
 
Approximately sixty percent of the Penn grade and 
Corning grade crude oil produced by the Ohio producers 
was sold and shipped to Pennsylvania refineries. One of 
these was Pennzoil's Rouseville refinery. The other was a 
refinery owned by Witco in Bradford, Pennsylvania. The 
remaining oil was sold to a refinery in West Virginia. Cam 
C. Colelli, who founded and runs Colelli, has stated in 
deposition that he knew his customers (the producers) 
would be shipping oil to Pennzoil's Rouseville refinery. In 
fact, in 1994 (prior to the events that underlie the present 
case), Pennzoil had complained of damage caused to its 
refinery by chlorides in Colelli solvents. Once the issue was 
brought to his attention, Cam Colelli worked with Pennzoil 
to alleviate the chloride problem. He sent samples of 
solvents to Pennzoil's laboratories for testing and attended 
a trade association seminar on the dangers of chlorides in 
crude oil solvents. 
 
In September 1995, Pennzoil initiated a diversity action 
in the Western District of Pennsylvania against Colelli & 
Associates, alleging that the anti-paraffin solvent injected 
into the Ohio oil wells contained silicon and that the silicon 
damaged its Rouseville refinery. The complaint also named 
Pyramid Treating, Inc. ("Pyramid") and T.O.P. Production 
and Oilfield Services, Inc. ("T.O.P.") as defendants. In April 
1996, Pennzoil amended its complaint to add Colelli Oil 
Well Services and Chemical Solvents, Inc. ("Chemical") as 
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defendants. Like Colelli, the other defendants are Ohio 
corporations with principal places of business in Ohio. 
 
In August 1996, Colelli moved to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On February 7, 1997, the 
district court granted Colelli's motion. Later that month, 
Pennzoil moved for modification of the February 7 order to 
permit an interlocutory appeal. Pyramid, T.O.P. and 
Chemical joined Pennzoil's motion. In May 1997, the 
district court granted Pennzoil's motion to permit the 
appeal. Subsequently, Pennzoil filed a petition for 
permission to appeal to this court, which was granted. 
Pyramid, T.O.P. and Chemical also filed a notice of appeal. 
The two appeals have been consolidated. 
 
II. 
 
Although the propriety of personal jurisdiction is in 
dispute, the district court clearly had subject-matter 
jurisdiction over this diversity action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1332(a). Furthermore, since its order dismissed some, but 
not all, of the defendants, the order was not final and 
appealable under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Nonetheless, the 
district court did grant permission for an interlocutory 
appeal. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b). 
 
To the extent that a district court makes factualfindings 
in determining personal jurisdiction, we review for clear 
error. Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, National Association v. 
Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1220 (3d Cir. 1992). However, a 
district court's decision that it possesses or lacks personal 
jurisdiction over certain defendants is an issue of law of 
which our review is plenary. Id. at 1221. 
 
III. 
 
There are specific analytical steps we must take in 
determining whether personal jurisdiction can be asserted 
over a nonresident defendant. Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure is the starting point. This rule 
"authorizes personal jurisdiction over non-resident 
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defendants to the extent permissible under the law of the 
state where the district court sits." Farino, 960 F.2d at 
1221 (citation omitted). The forum state in this case is 
Pennsylvania. That state's long-arm statute is codified at 42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5322.1 We have acknowledged that 
the statute permits Pennsylvania courts to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants"to the 
constitutional limits of the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the 
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment." Farino, 960 F.2d at 1221 
(citations omitted); see also Renner v. Lanard Toys Limited, 
33 F.3d 277, 279 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that 
"Pennsylvania's long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction to 
the fullest extent permissible under the Constitution"). A 
district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to 
Pennsylvania's long-arm statute is therefore valid as long as 
it is constitutional. Farino, 960 F.2d at 1221; see also 
Renner, 33 F.3d at 279 ("[T]his court's inquiry is solely 
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant would be constitutional.") (citation omitted). 
 
Next, we must determine whether the defendant's 
contacts with the forum state are sufficient to support 
general personal jurisdiction. Farino, 960 F.2d at 1221. 
When a state has general jurisdiction over a party, that 
party can be haled into court in that state "regardless of 
whether the subject matter of the cause of action has any 
connection to the forum." Id. A nonresident's contacts with 
the forum must be "continuous and substantial" to 
establish general jurisdiction. Provident National Bank v. 
California Federal Savings & Loan Association, 819 F.2d 
434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). However, no 
party in this case contends that there is a basis for general 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Two portions of Pennsylvania's long-arm statute are pertinent to this 
case. First, the statute contains a "tort out/harm in" provision which 
extends personal jurisdiction to anyone who "[c]aus[es] harm or tortious 
injury in th[e] Commonwealth by an act or omission outside th[e] 
Commonwealth." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 5322(a)(4). Second, section 
5322(b) of the statute states that jurisdiction extends "to all persons 
who 
are not within the scope of section 5301 [relating to general 
jurisdiction] 
to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States 
and may be based on the most minimum contact with this 
Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States." 
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jurisdiction in Pennsylvania -- so we are free to consider 
solely whether the alternative form of personal jurisdiction 
is present: specific personal jurisdiction. Specific 
jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff's claim " `is related to 
or arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum.' " 
Farino, 960 F.2d at 1221 (quoting Dollar Savings Bank v. 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., 746 F.2d 208, 211 (3d 
Cir. 1984)). 
 
To make a finding of specific jurisdiction, a court 
generally applies two standards, the first mandatory and 
the second discretionary. These standards serve to ensure 
that defendants receive due process as required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. First, a court must determine 
whether the defendant had the minimum contacts with the 
forum necessary for the defendant to have "reasonably 
anticipate[d] being haled into court there." World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 
(1980) (citations omitted). Second, assuming minimum 
contacts have been established, a court may inquire 
whether "the assertion of personal jurisdiction would 
comport with `fair play and substantial justice.' " Burger 
King Corporation v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) 
(quoting International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310, 320 (1945)). Although the latter standard need 
only be applied at a court's discretion, see Farino, 960 F.2d 
at 1222 (citing Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 476-77), we have 
generally chosen to engage in this second tier of analysis in 
determining questions of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Mesalic v. Fiberfloat Corporation, 897 F.2d 696, 701-02 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (considering notions of "fair play and substantial 
justice" in deciding issue of personal jurisdiction). 
 
A. 
 
1. 
 
We will first consider the application of Pennsylvania's 
long-arm statute to Colelli. Pennzoil and its co-appellants 
argue that the statute extends jurisdiction to Colelli under 
its "tort out/harm in" provision. The statute provides that 
personal jurisdiction extends to any person who "[c]aus[es] 
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harm or tortious injury in th[e] Commonwealth by an act or 
omission outside th[e] Commonwealth." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. 5322(a)(4).2 Pennzoil contends that specific 
jurisdiction arises from the alleged tortious injury it 
suffered in Pennsylvania, which was caused by Colelli in 
Ohio. (Again, no party maintains that there is any basis for 
general jurisdiction.) The district court rejected this 
contention, concluding that section 5322(a)(4) only applies 
to intentional tortfeasors -- not reckless or negligent 
tortfeasors as Pennzoil argued. Pennzoil Products Company 
v. Colelli & Associates, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 669, 675 (W.D. 
Pa. 1997). There is no foundation for this conclusion. The 
statute does not contain the modifier "intentional" in its 
reference to out-of-state tortfeasors. The statute simply 
extends jurisdiction to anyone who causes harm or tortious 
injury, intentionally or not, in Pennsylvania through acts or 
omissions outside Pennsylvania. We find guidance on this 
point from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which has 
interpreted the closely related provision of section 
5322(a)(3) (which addresses tortfeasors who cause injury in 
the state by acts or omissions within the state) as extending 
jurisdiction regardless of "what kind of tort is alleged." 
Kubik v. Letteri, 614 A.2d 1110, 1113 n.4 (Pa. 1992) 
(citation omitted). If the type of tort is irrelevant when 
committed within the state, there could be little reason it 
would matter when committed outside the state. 
 
One court of appeals has confronted this exact issue and 
reached the same conclusion. In Robinson v. Giarmarco & 
Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th Cir. 1996), the court of appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit had to determine whether Florida's 
long-arm statute extended jurisdiction to nonresident 
defendants who were being sued for negligent conduct 
outside of Florida which resulted in harm in Florida. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We should be cognizant that section 5322(a) only sets forth "examples 
of sufficient contact" (e.g., transacting business within the state, 
committing a tort within the state, etc.). Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz 
Company, 86 F.3d 1287, 1302 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 583 
(1996). Since section 5322(b) "further expands the potential bases for 
jurisdiction" to the limits of the U.S. Constitution, id., the list of 
examples of sufficient contact in section 5322(a) cannot be considered 
exhaustive. 
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Although the language of Florida's long-arm statute was not 
identical to Pennsylvania's, the Robinson court interpreted 
it to "reach[ ] the situation where a foreign tortious act 
cause[s] injury in [the forum state]." 74 F.3d at 257 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court 
then concluded that the long-arm statute could be used to 
assert jurisdiction against parties whose "negligence ha[d] 
allegedly caused damage . . . in Florida." Id. We find 
Robinson to be supportive of our conclusion that a "tort 
out/harm in" provision of a long-arm statute cannot be 
restricted to intentional tortfeasors if its plain language 
gives no indication that it should be so restricted. Thus, 
based on the plain language of section 5322(a)(4), as well as 
the reasoning of Kubik and Robinson, we conclude that the 
district court erred in ruling that Pennsylvania's "tort 
out/harm in" statute only extends to intentional tortfeasors.3 
 
The only way Colelli could argue that section 5322(a)(4) 
does not apply is by arguing that Pennzoil did not suffer an 
injury in Pennsylvania because it is not a Pennsylvania 
corporation (i.e., the harm is only "felt" wherever the 
corporation is headquartered). That argument, however, 
would also be untenable because we already rejected it in 
Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 679 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 
1982). In interpreting a long-arm statute very similar to 
section 5322(a)(4),4 we held that"when a commercial entity 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We acknowledge that, even if the "tort out/harm in" portion of 
Pennsylvania's long-arm statute did not extend to nonintentional 
tortfeasors, the statute could still potentially reach Colelli because it 
extends to the due-process limits of the Constitution. See Mellon Bank 
(East) PSFS, National Association v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 
1992) (citations omitted); Renner v. Lanard Toys Limited, 33 F.3d 277, 
279 (3d Cir. 1994). However, since the "tort out/harm in" provision 
describes the present situation so explicitly and since the district court 
partially based its ruling on an application of the "tort out/harm in" 
provision, we find it appropriate to consider the proper bounds of that 
provision in hearing this appeal. 
 
4. The long-arm statute (which was enacted in the U.S. Virgin Islands) in 
Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corporation extended jurisdiction to anyone who 
had "caus(ed) tortious injury in th[e] territory by an act or omission 
outside th[e] territory and regularly . . . solicit[ed] business or 
engage[d] 
in any other persistent course of conduct, or derive[d] substantial 
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sues for tortious injury to its physical property, the `injury' 
takes place for jurisdictional purposes where the property 
has been damaged." Id. at 1065. Since Pennzoil claims to 
have suffered damage to its refinery equipment in 
Pennsylvania, that is where -- for jurisdictional purposes -- 
we must conclude the alleged injury occurred. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
Pennsylvania's long-arm statute extends personal 
jurisdiction to Colelli. 
 
2. 
 
Although we conclude that Pennsylvania's long-arm 
statute extends jurisdiction to Colelli, we must still 
determine whether the strictures of constitutional due 
process (i.e., minimum contacts and notions of "fair play 
and substantial justice") would be observed by asserting 
jurisdiction.5 We cannot presume that jurisdiction is proper 
simply because the requirements of a long-arm statute have 
been met. Several courts of appeals have stressed this 
point. 
 
For example, in Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 
F.3d 623 (11th Cir. 1996), the court of appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit had to determine whether Florida's long- 
arm statute extended jurisdiction to several Canadian 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in th[e] 
territory." 679 F.2d 1051, 1062 (3d Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks, 
citation and emphasis omitted). Thus, the statute in Carty was not as 
far-reaching as the Pennsylvania statute but it operated under the same 
principle of extending jurisdiction to foreign tortfeasors. 
 
5. Since the "majority of states (and Puerto Rico) has enacted 
jurisdictional statutes that have been interpreted to extend to the limits 
of due process, [jurisdictional] analysis frequently is collapsed into a 
one-step inquiry: does jurisdiction satisfy due process?" 4 Charles A. 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure S 1069 (2d ed. 
Supp. 1998). However, as noted earlier, Pennzoil's "tort out/harm in" 
argument and the district court's rejection of that argument indicate that 
we must consider both the proper application of Pennsylvania's long-arm 
statute and the satisfaction of due process requirements -- not just the 
latter. See supra note 3. 
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defendants. In rendering its decision, the Sculptchair court 
described this two-part analysis: 
 
       First we must determine whether the Florida long-arm 
       statute provides a basis for personal jurisdiction. If so, 
       then we must determine whether sufficient minimum 
       contacts exist between the defendants and the forum 
       state so as to satisfy "traditional notions of fair play 
       and substantial justice" under the Due Process Clause 
       of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
94 F.3d at 626 (quoting Robinson, 74 F.3d at 256). Thus, 
according to Sculptchair, a court must engage in due 
process analysis after it concludes that a state's long-arm 
statute extends jurisdiction to a defendant. 
 
The court of appeals for the Sixth Circuit expressed the 
same understanding of due process in Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Company v. Tryg International Insurance 
Company, Ltd., 91 F.3d 790 (6th Cir. 1996). In a case 
involving the application of Ohio's long-arm statute to a 
Danish corporate defendant, the Nationwide Mutual court 
concluded that "[a] valid assertion of personal jurisdiction 
must satisfy both the state long-arm statute, and 
constitutional due process." 91 F.3d at 793 (quoting 
Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Federation, 23 
F.3d 1110, 1115 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 962 
(1994)) (emphasis added). Similarly, the court of appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit has stated, "The federal court in a 
diversity case must determine whether [a] defendant is 
subject to the court's jurisdiction under the state's long- 
arm statute, and if so, whether exercise of that jurisdiction 
comports with due process." Moog World Trade Corporation 
v. Bancomer, S.A., 90 F.3d 1382, 1384 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(applying Missouri's long-arm statute). See also Jobe v. ATR 
Marketing, Inc., 87 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(considering both state's long-arm statute and 
constitutional due process requirements); Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company v. Robertson-Ceco Corporation, 84 F.3d 
560, 567 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 508 
(1996); Viam Corporation v. Iowa Export-Import Trading 
Company, 84 F.3d 424, 427 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (same). 
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B. 
 
1. 
 
The issue of minimum contacts is rather fact-sensitive in 
that it turns on the "quality and nature of a defendant's 
activity [in relation to the forum state]." Max Daetwyler 
Corporation v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(citation omitted); see also Farino, 960 F.2d at 1224-25 
("[Q]uestions of personal jurisdiction do not lend themselves 
to categorical determinations."). Nonetheless, despite the 
difficulty in formulating bright-line rules in this area, some 
basic precepts have evolved in the assessment of minimum 
contacts. For example, if a nonresident defendant's contact 
with the forum is simply "fortuitous" or "the result of a 
single transaction," Max Daetwyler, 762 F.2d at 295, the 
minimum-contacts requirement has not been satisfied. 
Furthermore, with regard to producers or sellers of goods, 
"the mere foreseeability that a product one sells may end 
up in the forum state" does not render the seller amenable 
to suit in the forum state. Renner, 33 F.3d at 279 (citing 
Woodson, 444 U.S. at 291, 295). A finding of minimum 
contacts demands the demonstration of " `some act by 
which the defendant purposely avail[ed] itself of the 
privilege of conducting business within the forum State, 
thus invoking the protection and benefits of its laws.' " 
Farino, 960 F.2d at 1221 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
 
In many products-liability cases (of which this case is a 
sort), the seller does not come in direct contact with the 
forum state but does so through intermediaries such as 
retailers or distributors. In response to this phenomenon, 
courts have developed the "stream of commerce" theory by 
which specific jurisdiction is asserted over a nonresident 
defendant which injected its goods, albeit indirectly, into 
the forum state and either "derived [a] substantial benefit 
from the forum state or had a reasonable expectation of 
[deriving a substantial benefit from it]." Max Daetwyler, 762 
F.2d at 300. Clearly, the stream-of-commerce theory can 
appear somewhat abstruse without some definition of its 
key terms (e.g., When is a benefit "substantial"? When is an 
expectation "reasonable"?). 
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In Asahi Metal Industry Company, Ltd. v. Superior Court 
of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), the 
Supreme Court attempted to elucidate the elements of 
jurisdiction based on the stream-of-commerce theory. 
Unfortunately, the Asahi Metal Court presented three 
different conceptions of purposeful availment through the 
stream of commerce, none of which was endorsed by a 
majority of the Court.6 In Asahi Metal, a California plaintiff 
injured in a motorcycle accident in California filed a 
products liability suit in California against Cheng Shin, the 
Taiwan corporation that manufactured the motorcycle's tire 
tube, contending the tube was defective. Cheng Shin 
impleaded Asahi Metal Industry Company, Ltd., a Japanese 
corporation, seeking indemnification because Asahi had 
manufactured the valve assemblies for Cheng Shin's tire 
tubes. The plaintiff and Cheng Shin settled, leaving only the 
indemnity action between Cheng Shin and Asahi, which 
contested jurisdiction. 
 
Asahi had not solicited any business in California and 
had no offices, agents or property there. It sold its tube 
assemblies to Cheng Shin in Taiwan and had no control 
over the distribution system that brought its components 
into products eventually sold in California. The California 
Supreme Court concluded that Asahi knew that some of the 
valve assemblies would be incorporated into tire tubes sold 
in California and benefited indirectly from the sale of 
products incorporating the components in California. On 
this basis, the California Supreme Court sustained 
jurisdiction over Asahi. 
 
The Supreme Court reversed that ruling, as all the 
Justices agreed that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over Asahi was disconsonant with notions of "fair play and 
substantial justice." Renner, 33 F.3d at 281 (discussing 
Asahi Metal generally).7 However, the Justices were divided 
on the level of minimum contacts necessary for afinding of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The voting breakdown among the Justices was 4-4-1. See generally 
Asahi Metal Industry Company, Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 
Solano County, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 
7. We synopsized the facts, as well as the various analytical frameworks, 
of Asahi Metal in Renner, 33 F.3d at 281-82. 
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jurisdiction under the stream-of-commerce theory. For this 
reason, the Court issued three different methods of 
analysis. Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality of four, 
concluded that placement of a product in the stream of 
commerce must be accompanied by some "[a]dditional 
conduct of the defendant [that] may indicate an intent or 
purpose to serve the market in the forum State." Asahi 
Metal, 480 U.S. at 112. Justice O'Connor provided the 
following examples of such conduct: "designing the product 
for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum 
State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to 
customers in the forum State, or marketing the product 
through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales 
agent in the forum State." Id. 
 
Justice Brennan, writing for another plurality of four, 
disagreed that a finding of such "additional conduct" was 
necessary. Noting that the stream of commerce does not 
consist of "unpredictable currents or eddies," Justice 
Brennan stated that "[a]s long as a participant in this 
process is aware that the final product is being marketed in 
the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot 
come as a surprise." Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
This premise led him to conclude: 
 
       A defendant who has placed goods in the stream of 
       commerce benefits economically from the retail sale of 
       the final product in the forum State, and indirectly 
       benefits from the State's laws that regulate and 
       facilitate commercial activity. These benefits accrue 
       regardless of whether that participant directly conducts 
       business in the forum State, or engages in additional 
       conduct directed toward the State. 
 
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 
Justice Stevens, the ninth vote, presented a third 
viewpoint in his concurring opinion (which was joined by 
Justices White and Blackmun, who also joined Justice 
Brennan's concurrence). First, Justice Stevens observed 
that the Court's disquisition on minimum contacts was 
superfluous since the reversal was based on concerns 
about "fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 121-22 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and 
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citation omitted). Nonetheless, he felt compelled to voice his 
distaste for the belief that "an unwavering line can be 
drawn between `mere awareness' that a component will find 
its way into the forum State and `purposeful availment' of 
the forum's market." Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted). Justice Stevens posited, instead, that a 
determination of purposeful availment must be made 
considering the following factors: "the volume, the value, 
and the hazardous character of the components [placed in 
the stream of commerce]." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). He 
even went so far as to offer a rough estimate of the type of 
volume that would suggest purposeful availment: "I would 
be inclined to conclude that a regular course of dealing that 
results in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a 
period of several years would constitute `purposeful 
availment' . . . ." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice 
Stevens departed from the formulations of the two plurality 
opinions because (1) he did not find Justice O'Connor's 
factor of "additional conduct" to be dispositive or even 
relevant and (2) he considered the extent of the benefit (e.g., 
in terms of value or volume) derived from the forum State, 
a factor irrelevant to Justice Brennan's analysis, to be 
highly dispositive. 
 
Obviously, Asahi Metal does not erect any bright-line 
guideposts -- and that point is evidenced in the federal 
appellate court decisions that have come in its wake. Some 
courts of appeals have boldly adopted one of the conflicting 
conceptions of minimum contacts via the stream of 
commerce. Compare, e.g., Barone v. Rich Brothers Interstate 
Display Fireworks Company, 25 F.3d 610, 613-15 (8th Cir. 
1994) (adopting a position consistent with that of Justice 
Brennan) and Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson 
Company, 9 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 1993) (same) with Boit 
v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(adopting a position consistent with that of Justice 
O'Connor) and Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1519 (11th 
Cir. 1990) (same). Most courts of appeals, however, have 
avoided choosing one position over the other and have 
instead decided cases based on facts in the record. See, 
e.g., Beverly Hills Fan Company v. Royal Sovereign 
Corporation, 21 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Tobin v. 
Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 543 (6th 
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Cir. 1993); Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc. , 985 F.2d 
1534, 1548 (11th Cir. 1993);8Shute v. Carnival Cruise 
Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 382 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other 
grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). In our most recent stream- 
of-commerce case, Renner, we too did not have occasion to 
choose between the O'Connor and Brennan positions 
because we concluded that the factual record had to be 
developed through further discovery. 33 F.3d at 283. 
Consequently, we remanded the case to the district court 
without adopting one position or the other on the issue of 
minimum contacts based on the stream-of-commerce 
theory. 
 
2. 
 
After making a determination with regard to minimum 
contacts, a court has the option of evaluating whether 
exercising jurisdiction comports with notions of "fair play 
and substantial justice." That is, even if a defendant has 
the requisite minimum contacts with the forum state, other 
factors may militate against exercising jurisdiction. These 
"fairness factors" include: "the burden on the defendant, 
the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the 
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective 
relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining 
the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the 
shared interest of the several States in furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies." Rudzewicz, 471 
U.S. at 477 (quoting Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The court of appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has manifested some 
ambivalence in this regard in that it has issued opinions both embracing 
Justice O'Connor's standard and declining to adopt either standard. 
Compare Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th 
Cir. 1993) ("Because jurisdiction . . . over [the defendant] in this case 
. . . 
is consistent with due process under the more stringent `stream of 
commerce plus' analysis adopted by the [O'Connor] plurality, we need 
not determine which standard actually controls this case.") with Madara 
v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1519 (11th Cir. 1990) (concluding that exercise 
of jurisdiction must satisfy the stream-of-commerce test articulated by 
the O'Connor plurality). 
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As mentioned earlier, application of the "fair play and 
substantial justice" prong is left to a court's discretion. See 
Farino, 960 F.2d at 1222. Nonetheless, we typically apply 
this second tier of the analysis in resolving issues of 
personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mesalic, 897 F.2d at 701-02 
(concluding that assertion of personal jurisdiction 
comported with notions of "fair play and substantial 
justice"). Moreover, we have referred to its application as 
mandatory, not discretionary. Id. at 701 ("Having 
determined that there were sufficient minimum contacts, 
we must determine whether the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction accords with notions of `fair play and 
substantial justice.' ") (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
The very fact that the Supreme Court precedent most 
pertinent to this matter -- Asahi Metal-- was decided on 
this basis counsels its application to the present case. This 
final step (i.e., assessing the "fairness" of asserting 
jurisdiction) concludes a court's jurisdictional analysis. 
 
C. 
 
1. 
 
We now turn to the issue of whether exercising 
jurisdiction over Colelli complies with the requirements of 
due process under the Constitution. Initially, we must 
determine whether Colelli had minimum contacts with 
Pennsylvania by selling solvents to Ohio oil producers. 
Three facts are pertinent to this determination: (1) 
approximately sixty percent of the Penn grade and Corning 
grade crude oil produced by the Ohio oil producers was 
sold to Pennsylvania refineries; (2) Cam Colelli knew that oil 
produced by Colelli's Ohio customers was going to 
Pennzoil's refinery in Pennsylvania; and (3) in response to 
the 1994 chloride problem, Cam Colelli sent samples of 
Colelli solvents to laboratory personnel at Pennzoil's 
refinery to preclude future contamination problems.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Both Pennzoil and Colelli contend that a fourth fact is relevant: i.e., 
Cam Colelli admitted that he had some concerns that silicon in Colelli 
solvents could cause problems for some refineries. Pennzoil argues that 
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Keeping these facts in mind, we will apply the stream-of- 
commerce standards enunciated in Asahi Metal. 
 
Looking first to Justice O'Connor's standard (which is 
more stringent than Justice Brennan's), the placement of a 
product in the stream of commerce must be accompanied 
by some "[a]dditional conduct of the defendant [that] may 
indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the 
forum State." Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 112. Justice 
O'Connor proffered the following as examples of such 
additional conduct: "[1] designing the product for the 
market in the forum State . . . [2] establishing channels for 
providing regular advice to customers in the forum State." 
Id. Colelli's actions clearly conformed to Justice O'Connor's 
definition of "additional conduct." Sending solvent samples 
to Pennzoil's laboratories demonstrated an intent to 
"design" a product which could be used to serve the 
Pennsylvania refinery market. Furthermore, the record 
indicates that Cam Colelli had a number of telephone 
conversations with lab personnel at Pennzoil's refinery to 
discuss testing procedures and methodology. Thus, Cam 
Colelli had established "channels for providing regular 
advice to" Pennzoil's personnel in Pennsylvania. Although 
Pennzoil was not technically a "customer" of Colelli's (since 
Colelli did not sell solvents directly to Pennzoil), Colelli was 
obviously motivated by the fact that Pennzoil operated one 
of the two major refineries in the state to which the Ohio 
producers sent sixty percent of their crude oil. Cam Colelli 
admits that he knew Pennzoil held such a significant 
portion of the Ohio producers' customer base;10 the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the admission demonstrates knowledge of the dangers of silicon-tainted 
solvents. Colelli, on the other hand, argues that Cam Colelli only thought 
that silicon could be problematic because it acts as an anti-foaming 
agent, and not because he was aware of any potential for serious 
damage. Both of these arguments are irrelevant to our analysis because 
they address the merits of Pennzoil's claim, not the issue of 
jurisdiction. 
Cam Colelli's beliefs about the potential degree of harm do not shed any 
light on where, no matter how slight or how severe, he thought that 
harm would occur. 
 
10. When asked how he knew that the Ohio producers would send oil to 
Pennzoil's refinery, Cam Colelli responded, "The oil producers told me. 
There weren't that many refineries. Being that Pennzoil was the biggest, 
it was pretty obvious, in a sense." (Emphasis added.) 
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"additional conduct" of ensuring that the solvents met 
Pennzoil's requirements evinces a desire to satisfy that 
portion of the customer base. For these reasons, we 
conclude that Justice O'Connor's touchstone of additional 
conduct is present in this case. According to Justice 
O'Connor's standard, Colelli had the minimum contacts 
with Pennsylvania necessary for it to be haled into court in 
that state. 
 
Next, we apply the standard articulated by Justice 
Brennan. This standard is even more clearly satisfied than 
Justice O'Connor's.11 Colelli has "placed goods [i.e., 
solvents] in the stream of commerce [and] benefit[ed] 
economically from the . . . sale of the final product[, i.e., 
crude oil, to refineries] in the forum State." Id. at 117 
(Brennan, J., concurring). As such, Colelli "benefit[ed] from 
[Pennsylvania]'s laws that regulate and facilitate 
commercial activity." Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). 
According to Justice Brennan's standard, therefore, Colelli 
had the minimum contacts necessary for Pennsylvania to 
exercise jurisdiction.12 
 
In summary, regardless of whether one applies the 
O'Connor standard or the Brennan standard, Colelli 
purposely availed itself of the laws of Pennsylvania by 
deriving financial benefits from its customers' sale of crude 
oil to Pennsylvania refineries. The Ohio producers sent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. One may note that, since Justice O'Connor's standard is more 
demanding than Justice Brennan's, any factual scenario that satisfies 
the former will probably satisfy the latter as well. Still, since we have 
not 
manifested a preference for either of the two standards, the demands of 
clarity counsel us to apply both standards explicitly. The clear 
satisfaction of both the O'Connor and the Brennan standards obviates 
any need to adopt one over the other. 
 
12. Although it is not essential to our analysis, we note that Colelli 
even 
had minimum contacts under Justice Stevens' standard. The relative 
volume and value (two of the three factors central to Justice Stevens' 
position) of the silicon-laced oil forwarded to Pennsylvania is not in 
dispute: sixty percent of the crude oil generated by the Ohio producers 
found its way to Pennsylvania. Also, the "hazardous character" of the 
silicon (to property interests if not personal safety) is apparent from 
the 
damage caused to Pennzoil's refinery. Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 122 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
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most of their oil to Pennsylvania; Colelli indirectly benefited 
from the sale to Pennsylvania refineries; Cam Colelli was 
aware of that indirect benefit; and Colelli had expressed a 
desire to preserve its relationship with at least one 
Pennsylvania refinery (Pennzoil's) by conforming its solvents 
to the refinery's specifications. For the reasons discussed 
above, these facts satisfy the criteria of both Justice 
O'Connor and Justice Brennan.13 We therefore conclude 
that Colelli did have the minimum contacts needed to 
support the exercise of personal jurisdiction in 
Pennsylvania. 
 
2. 
 
Finally, having determined that Colelli can be haled into 
court in Pennsylvania, we must determine whether such an 
exercise of jurisdiction would respect notions of"fair play 
and substantial justice." Justice Brennan noted that cases 
are "rare . . . in which minimum requirements in the 
concept of fair play and substantial justice . . . defeat the 
reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant 
has purposefully engaged in forum activities." Id. at 116 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 
477-78) (internal quotation marks omitted). The present 
case is not one of those rare cases described by Justice 
Brennan. 
 
None of the "fairness factors" -- the burden on the 
defendant, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the 
dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and 
effective relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in 
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies and 
the shared interest of the several states in furthering 
fundamental social policies -- suggest that exercising 
jurisdiction would be unreasonable in this case."This is not 
a case where a severe burden is placed on an alien 
defendant as in Asahi[ Metal]. Nor does this case involve 
one isolated occurrence where the defendant had no 
connection with the forum state, as in [Woodson]." Mesalic, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Since the facts of this case satisfy the standards of both Asahi Metal 
pluralities, we do not have occasion to select one standard or the other 
as the law of this circuit. 
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897 F.2d at 702. Colelli, which comprises two Ohio 
corporations, has been haled into district court in a state 
with which Ohio shares a border. Far from being isolated, 
Colelli's connection with the forum state has been bolstered 
by steady shipments of crude oil across that border. 
Furthermore, the suit was brought in the Western District 
of Pennsylvania, the district closest to Ohio. If we were to 
deem litigation in the Western District of Pennsylvania to be 
unreasonably onerous for Ohio defendants, we would create 
an unacceptable implication: i.e., that no foreign defendant 
could be haled into court in Pennsylvania -- because any 
burden borne by Ohio defendants would be the same for 
foreign defendants from other neighboring states and even 
greater for foreign defendants who are not domiciled in a 
neighboring state. Thus, we conclude that Colelli would not 
endure an unreasonable inconvenience by litigating this 
matter in Pennsylvania. See Interfirst Bank Clifton v. 
Fernandez, 844 F.2d 279, 285 (5th Cir.) ("The situation is 
unlike that in Asahi[ Metal], where the defendant, a 
Japanese corporation, would have had to travel to 
California and contend with a foreign legal system.[The 
defendant in this case] was asked only to travel to a 
neighboring state.") (citation omitted), amended on other 
grounds, 853 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 
When the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction 
over Colelli, Pennzoil refiled this action against Colelli in 
district court in Ohio. Considering the fact that several 
Ohio corporations are involved, one cannot deny Ohio's 
interest in this matter. Yet, Pennsylvania also has an 
interest in this dispute, since the only alleged harm 
occurred in Pennsylvania and relates to the oil industry -- 
an industry which is important for any state economy. 
Whatever the degree of Pennsylvania's interest in this 
matter, it cannot be considered any less than Ohio's. 
Finally, we cannot conceive of any judicial inefficiency or 
impairment of a substantive social policy that would result 
from exercising jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. 
 
Indeed, Colelli itself does not even explain with any 
specificity how exercising jurisdiction would offend notions 
of "fair play and substantial justice." No claims of 
exorbitant travel expenses, unavailability of evidence, 
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drains on judicial resources or countervailing state 
interests have been made. Instead, Colelli merely argues 
that any exercise of jurisdiction without minimum contacts 
cannot comply with notions of "fair play and substantial 
justice." However, since we conclude that minimum 
contacts are present in this case, we reject this argument. 
Concomitantly, we conclude that exercising jurisdiction 
would be in accord with notions of "fair play and 
substantial justice." 
 
IV. 
 
To recapitulate, we conclude that Pennsylvania's long- 
arm statute properly extends personal jurisdiction to Colelli 
and that the exercise of such jurisdiction satisfies the 
requirements of constitutional due process. Accordingly, we 
will reverse the judgment of the district court and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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